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We give an example of a wide class of problems for which quantum information protocols based
on multi-system entanglement can be mapped into much simpler ones involving one system. Secret
sharing is a cryptographic primitive which plays a central role in various secure multiparty computa-
tion tasks and management of keys in cryptography. In secret sharing protocols, a classical message
is divided into shares given to recipient parties in such a way that some number of parties need to
collaborate in order to reconstruct the message. Quantum protocols for the task commonly rely on
multi-partite GHZ entanglement. We present a multiparty secret sharing protocol which requires
only sequential communication of a single quantum d-level system (for any prime d). It has huge
advantages in scalabilility and can be realized with the state of the art technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Splitting a message into N shares so that the origi-
nal message can be reconstructed if and only if at least
k ≤ N of the shares are known is called a (N, k) secret
sharing threshold scheme (the threshold is k). Secret
sharing constitutes an important cryptographic primitive
in protocols for secure multiparty computation includ-
ing password-authenticated key agreement, hardware se-
curity modules, private querying of databases, and es-
tablishment of access codes with restricted access. The
first secret sharing schemes were presented independently
by Shamir and Blakley by means of classical algorithms
to split the message and classical communication to dis-
tribute the shares [1, 2].
In Shamir’s (N, k) secret sharing threshold scheme, the
distributor chooses a set of k positive integers, known
only to him/her, a0, ..., ak−1 ∈ {1, ..., P}, where P is
some large prime. The first integer a0 is the secret. The
k’th order polynomial p(x) = a0 + a1x+ . . .+ ak−1xk−1,
is used for coding the data. For l = 1, ..., N the distribu-
tor computes p(l) and communicates the value only the
l’th party. If at least k of the recipients collaborate, they
can easily recover the secret a0, whereas knowing fewer
than k shares yields no information on a0. However, like
many schemes in classical cryptography, Shamir’s scheme
is vulnerable to intercept-resend attacks on the commu-
nications of the distributor.
The security for cryptographic tasks can be enforced by
introducing quantum resources [3, 4]. Quantum methods
for (classical) secret sharing by three parties in a form
of cryptographic protocol based on three particle GHZ
entanglement [5] were given in [6]. In an independent
later development, secret sharing protocols for three or
four parties were proposed in Ref. [7]. Secret sharing
for arbitrary many parties exploiting multipartite qubit
entanglement can be found in Ref. [8], wherein security
issues were shown to be linked to Bell inequalities. A
general secret sharing scheme using multipartite d-level
entanglement is given in [9]. Also, general (N, k) quan-
tum secret sharing threshold schemes have been analyzed
in Ref. [10].
There are several experimental demonstrations of se-
cret sharing schemes with quantum resources. Three and
four partite secret sharing using entanglement were re-
ported in Refs. [12, 13]. However, entanglement-based
protocols are not scalable. The difficulty of obtaining the
required quantum correlations grows with the number of
parties involved.
Fortunately, a more scalable secret sharing (of classical
data) can be achieved using only sequential communica-
tion of a single qubit, see Ref. [14]. The work reports a
successful proof-of-principle experimental demonstration
of six party secret sharing of such a kind. Nevertheless,
the security of proposed secret sharing schemes is not
as robust as the security of Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD). This is discussed in Ref. [15, 16] for both the
entanglement-based scheme of [6, 7] and the single qubit
scheme of [14].
In this letter, we present a (N,N) secret sharing
threshold scheme using a single d-level quantum system,
for odd prime dimension d. We investigate eavesdrop-
ping attacks and security issues. Finally, we discuss the
scalability and efficiency of our protocol in comparison
to other schemes involving qudit systems. Our principal
aim is to show that you can map GHZ state protocols
extended to d-level systems into protocols involving se-
quential transfer of a single qudit (as this is a significant
simplification of such schemes). We restrict d to odd
primes because our protocol uses a cyclic property of a
set of Mutually Unbiased (orthonormal) Bases (MUBs).
Many MUBs are still unknown [17]. Complete sets are
only known for dimensions which are powers of prime
numbers [18]. For this restricted set of dimensions, the
algebraic property on which our scheme relies was found
only for odd prime dimensions.
The relation of our single qudit scheme with respect
to GHZ state qudit secret sharing can be thought to be
2similar to that of the BB84 QKD-protocol [3] and the E91
QKD-protocol [19] based on entanglement. However, due
to the in principle arbitrary number of parties involved,
significant advantages of the single qudit scheme emerge
with the growing number parties.
II. SECRET SHARING USING GHZ STATE
CORRELATIONS
Let us first describe a secret sharing protocol using
multipartite d-level entanglement, for which d is an odd
prime. This particular protocol is outlined in [9].
The protocol is designed for N + 1 party secret shar-
ing and requires an N + 1 partite d-level GHZ state:
|GHZN+1d 〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
j=0 |j〉⊗N+1. The party 1 (R1) act-
ing as the distributor prepares the GHZ state, keeps one
particle, and distributes the remaining N particles to the
N recipient parties. In the given run, each of the N + 1
parties independently chooses one of d possible bases in
which the local particle is measured.
For security purposes, all parties choose their measure-
ment bases from a set of d MUBs. The unit vectors be-
longing to the full set of d+ 1 MUBs will be denoted as
|e(j)l 〉 where j = 0, ..., d labels the basis and l = 0, ..., d−1
enumerates the vectors of the given basis. One has for
j 6= j′: ∣∣∣〈e(j)l |e(j′)l′ 〉∣∣∣2 = 1d. (1)
Apart from the computational basis, for which we give
the index j = d, and denote its states by |k〉, the remain-
ing d MUBs are given by
|e(j)l 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωk(l+jk)|k〉 (2)
where ω = e2pii/d. It can be easily shown that (2) satisfies
(1) for all prime dimensions [20]. We will denote by M
the set of all vectors belonging to the MUB defined by
(2), and its elements by Ml,j, with the meaning of the
indices as above.
In each run of the experiment party n (denoted by Rn)
chooses randomly a measurement basis jn. The local
measurement in the basis projects his/her particle onto
one of vectors Ml,jn . This is governed by the probability
distribution
P (l1, . . . , lN+1|j1, ..., jN+1)
= 1dN+2
∣∣∣∑d−1k=0 ω−∑N+1n=1 (kln+k2jn)∣∣∣2 .
Perfect GHZ correlations are possible if
N+1∑
n=1
jn = 0 mod d. (3)
In such a case, only results satisfying
∑N+1
n=1 ln = 0
mod d occur, and all sets satisfying this relation are
equally probable. However, if condition (3) does not
hold, then the probability distribution of the results is
uniform. This is easy to see once one realizes that (2)
and (1) implies that |∑d−1k=0 ωk(l+jk)|2 = d for j 6= 0 and
any l.
Once the measurements are performed, the parties an-
nounce their choices of jn. The distributor checks con-
dition (3). Only if it is satisfied, the round is treated
as valid and is used for secret sharing. The local results
satisfy
∑N+1
n=1 ln = 0 mod d, whereas a sum with one or
more ln missing has an arbitrary value (mod d). Thus
even N − 1 collaborating parties cannot learn the values
obtained by the other two. But N parties can establish
the value of the remaining party. As the choices of jn are
random, the protocol succeeds in 1/d of the cases.
III. SECRET SHARING WITH A SINGLE
QUDIT
Our protocol relies on a cyclic property of the set of
MUBs: there exist unitary transformations Ul′j′ , such
that for any l′, j′ ∈ {0, ..., d − 1}, any vector Ml,j can
be mapped into Ml+l′,j+j′ . That is, elements of M are
mapped into elements of M .
Note that, for any vectorMl,j can be transformed into
Ml+1,j by applying the transformation
Xd =
d−1∑
n=0
ωn|n〉〈n| (4)
Simply, using (4) and (2), one gets
Xd|e(j)l 〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
n=0 ω
n|n〉〈n|∑d−1k=0 ωk(l+jk) |k〉
= 1√
d
∑d−1
k=1 ω
k((l+1)+jk)|k〉 = |e(j)l+1〉. (5)
Also, any Ml,j can be transformed into Ml,j+1 by
Yd =
d−1∑
n=0
ωn
2 |n〉〈n|. (6)
This can be shown in a similar way. Thus, by applying
the operator Ul′j′ = X
l′
d Y
j′
d , any Ml,j is mapped into
Ml+l′,j+j′ .
The protocol runs as follows.
(i) The distributor R1, who by the nature of the task
is always assumed to be an honest party, prepares the
state |e(0)0 〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
j=0 |j〉 ∈ M , which will be denoted
by |ψd0〉.
(ii) R1 picks two random numbers x1, y1 ∈ {0, ..., d −
1}, and performs on |ψd0〉 the transformation Xx1d Y y1d .
This gives |ψd1〉 ∈M . The state is sent to party R2.
(iii) For n = 2, ..., N + 1, the party Rn generates two
independent random numbers xn, yn ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}, and
3applies Xxnd Y
yn
d to the qudit |ψdn−1〉 received from Rn−1.
Rn’s action gives a state |ψdn〉 which is sent to subsequent
party Rn+1, except in case of RN+1 who sends the qudit
back to the distributor, R1.
(iv) R1 randomly chooses J ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} and mea-
sures the qudit in the basis {|e(J)l 〉}l. The outcome is
labeled a ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}.
(v) In random order only parties R2, ..., RN+1 an-
nounce their choice of yn. The distributor announces
only whether the round is valid or not. It is valid pro-
vided:
N+1∑
n=1
yn = J mod d. (7)
Otherwise the round is rejected. If the round is valid, the
private data of the parties, {xn}, satisfy globally
N+1∑
n=1
xn = a mod d. (8)
The data exhibit perfect correlations and thus can be
used for secret sharing, as was the case for GHZ based
protocols, provided R1 resets his/her x1 to x
(scrt)
1 = x1−
a. Again, the probability of a valid round is 1/d.
(vi) In order to check the security, for a randomly cho-
sen (by the distributor) subset of the rounds, all parties
R2, ..., RN+1 announce their values of their private data
xn (in the same sequence as was the announcement of
yn’s). The distributor checks (8). If R1 registers a sub-
stantial fraction check runs for which (8) does not hold,
R1 declares the whole secret sharing attempt as corrupt
(more details on security checks later).
(vii) If the secret sharing attempt is not corrupt, par-
ties R2, ..., RN+1, after exchanging all their data xn for
a valid run, not used in the security check, can learn the
otherwise secret value x
(scrt)
1 , for the given run, earlier
known only to the distributor R1.
The protocol works because after all the transforma-
tions the final state reads
|ψdfinal〉 =
(
N+1∏
n=1
Xxnd Y
yn
d
)
|ψd0〉
=
1√
d
(
|0〉+
d−1∑
k=1
ω
∑N+1
n=1 (kxn+k
2yn)|k〉
)
. (9)
R1’s measurement of (9) yields an outcome with unit
probability, provided |ψdfinal〉 is an eigenstate of the mea-
sured observable. This happens if and only if (7) is sat-
isfied. Otherwise, |ψdfinal〉 is some element Ml′,j′ with
j′ 6= J and thus by (1) the probability of any outcome is
1/d.
For a valid run the correlations are effectively equiva-
lent to the ones for the GHZ based protocol: the choice
of yn corresponds to Rn’s choice of measurement basis,
while xn is analogous to the local outcome.
IV. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Protocols for secret sharing have to guarantee security.
Consider an example of an attack by an external eaves-
dropper. If the eavesdropper, Eve, attempts an intercept-
resend attack and intercepts the qudit, in the state |e(j)l 〉,
on the way form Rk to Rk+1, she can choose one of d rele-
vant bases to measure. With probability 1/d she chooses
a basis j′ = j and the attack succeeds, but with probabil-
ity d−1d she has j 6= j′ in which case the state she sends to
Rk+1 will be altered. The eavesdropping, to some extent
depending on d, causes inconsistencies between the pri-
vate data and condition (8), and is therefore detectable
in step (vi) of the protocol.
For more general eavesdropping attacks, in the qudit
transfer from Rk and Rk+1, we can regard the parties
R1, ..., Rk as a ’block’ effectively representing a single
party, and parties Rk+1, ..., RN+1 and R1, acting as the
measuring party, we can treat similarly. Thus, the attack
is reducible to the scenario encountered in the BB84 two-
party QKD (see e.g. [21]) in which the sender and the
receiver, both effectively our R1, do not announce their
bases, but only validity of a run. Generally, this makes
security effectively perfect, even if Eve tries this strategy
at more than one qudit transfer link.
An alternative trick which can be used by Eve is to
send via the unitary gate of partner Rk one more qudit
or even a multi qudit pulse, say separated in time, so
that it can be somehow intercepted by her beyond the
gate, without intercepting the protocol qudit. After yk
is announced she can learn the actual unitary transfor-
mation and thus xn. However, this is easily detectable,
if Rk makes the number of particles measurement at the
exit of his/her gate (in some randomly chosen runs).
Yet another possibility is for Eve to intercept the qu-
dit sent by R1, and send a qudit of her own to R2 in its
stead. Eve collects her qudit once it is sent by RN+1,
and waits for the announcement of yn’s. The intercepted
qudit of R1 can be somehow manipulated by her, how-
ever it must reach the measurement station of R1 at the
right time. After yn’s are announced she can measure
her qudit and recover the value x2 + . . .+ xN+1 mod d.
However, the attack will be detected in step (vi) of the
protocol since R1 performs the measurement before the
yn’s are announced. There is no way for Eve to perform a
yn’s dependent manipulation on a qudit which is already
measured by R1.
A. Discussing security against conspiracies
In secret sharing one faces the possibility of conspiring
cheating subsets of parties. In the worst case, only the
distributor R1 and one more party are honest, leaving
N − 1 conspiring parties. Conspiracies significantly com-
plicates the security analysis of secret sharing schemes
and much is therefore unknown about security of var-
ious schemes. Here, we will discuss the robustness of
4our scheme against some particular conspiracies. How-
ever, rigorous security proof for general conspiracies is
unknown.
In, e.g., Refs [16, 22] eavesdropping attacks using quan-
tum memories and entangling of systems with an ancilla
were shown to lead to security problems in the protocol
of Ref. [14]. However, the attacks of [22] require that ei-
ther the first or the final party are cheating, which never
happens in our protocol as R1 is effectively both first an
last party. Additionally, the eavesdropping attacks of [22]
require knowledge of also y1 and J , which is impossible
since R1 never announces any data.
More generally, the cheaters could use some attack
based on entangling the qudit with an ancilla, or pos-
sibly storing the protocol qudit in a quantum memory
and creating a new entangled state, of which a subsystem
is communicated further along the protocol loop. Still,
they ought not to be able to profit. The reason is the
absence of data announcement from R1 renders the qu-
dit available for the cheaters effectively in a mixed state,
for which there is no observable which would give an out-
come with unit probability. Furthermore, if the cheaters
combine their attack with eavesdropping, on the actions
of the honest parties, they will be detected in step (vi) of
the protocol on basis of the arguments from the previous
section.
V. COMPARING SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
There exists a number of quantum protocols for secret
sharing. The protocols for three and four-partite secret
sharing proposed in [7] and its generalization to high-level
multipartite configurations [9] requires the preparation of
a high-fidelity GHZ state with N + 1 subsystems. With
growing N this becomes an increasingly difficult task.
The experimental requirements make these schemes un-
scalable. Furthermore, another problem arises if we also
consider inefficient detection. Let η ∈ [0, 1] be the detec-
tor efficiency. Given that the condition (3) is satisfied for
a particular round, it is required that all parties succeed
with their measurements otherwise the round has to be
rejected. The probability that all N + 1 detection sta-
tions give a successful detection is ηN+1. Furthermore,
note that in GHZ state protocols d(N + 1) detectors are
required. As each detection station introduces possible
registration errors, the overall error would accumulate.
However, such GHZ state protocols can enable security
against device manipulation which is an important secu-
rity feature when the experimenter does not fully control
its own measuring device.
Consider now secret sharing with QKD involving qu-
dits, in which the distributor uses N pairwise indepen-
dent QKD channels, each shared with one of the recip-
ients. The protocol of such type which is directly com-
parable to our scheme involves encoding in d different
MUBs. For every round the distributor sends data xn
to party n such that suitable correlations are obtained
to achieve secret sharing. However, using d-level QKD
each recipient has a probability of 1/d to choose the cor-
rect basis. If the QKD scheme between the distributor
and Rn is repeated m times, the probability that Rn
chooses the correct basis at least once is 1 − (1− 1d)m.
For successful secret sharing through QKD, the distribu-
tor has to repeat the scheme independently with each
party until all of them report a correct choice of ba-
sis at least once. The probability, psuccess, that for all
n = 2, ..., N + 1, Rn has at least one correct choice is
psuccess =
(
1− (1− 1d)m)N . Solving for the number of
rounds, m, we find m =
⌈
ln(1−p1/Nsuccess)
ln(1−1/d)
⌉
. As an example,
we can choose N = 10, and pick d large, say d = 23, so
that psuccess leads to a good estimate of the number of
rounds required to distribute exactly one number to each
recipient. We require that the probability of success is
somewhat high, say psuccess = 0.8. Then the approxi-
mate number of rounds required is about m = 86. For
distributing a secret of realistic size in many shares and to
guaratee its security, one will typically need to distribute
larger data sets. In this estimation we have not consid-
ered the parties having inefficient detectors. Including
this possibility decreases the protocol efficiency by an
average factor of ηN . Therefore, such QKD-schemes re-
quires much more rounds and detectors than our scheme.
However, the security of QKD [21] is more robust and
well studied than that of secret sharing, which allows for
higher security to the price of lower efficiency.
The security can be further increased for such QKD
schemes by performing the QKD in a device indepen-
dent manner, i.e. with parties performing measurements
on entangled state obtaining data that violates a Bell
inequality. However, this also leads to an additional re-
duction of efficiency due to the low key rates high experi-
mental requirements associated with device independent
schemes.
In our protocol, for any N , only a single qudit is re-
quired. This enhances experimental feasibility: there is
no issue of scalability of the initial state preparation. As
the protocol involves just one detector station scalability
is further enhanced. In addition, from the point of view of
interferometry, our scheme is in the domain of single par-
ticle interference. It is well known that one can achieve
very high interference visibilities in such cases whereas
multiparticle interference effects for photons can accuire
high visibilities only in the case of two qubits. Multipho-
ton qudit experiments will experience alignment prob-
lems, errors due to imperfections in the optical compo-
nents and only partial distinguishability of photons com-
ming from different sources [23]. For security purposes,
it is very important to keep the quantum error rates to
a minimum. However, our scheme requires control over
the devices and the security against collective attacks re-
mains unknown. Finally, we do note that our scheme
requires the same number of local unitary operations as
is used in the corresponding GHZ state protocol [9], and
is therefore subject to the same accumulation of noise
5due to imperfections in the local unitary actions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a secret sharing protocol using only
a communication of a single qudit. While the security
proofs are incomplete against possible sophisticated at-
tacks which we did not include in our analysis, the scheme
is secure against standard attacks. The scheme provides
big advantages in scalability over earlier schemes and
thus make proof-of-concept experiments feasible. More-
over, using our methods a wide class of quantum proto-
cols using (multiparty) entanglement can be mapped into
simple ones involving one qudit.
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